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Thawing a Frozen Treaty:
Protecting United States Interests in the
Arctic with a Congressional-Executive
Agreement on the Law of the Sea
by ANDREW KING
I. Introduction
The steadily shrinking Arctic ice cap has triggered a feverish interest
among the five nations whose coastlines border the region concerning their
respective rights to the ocean and the seabed below.' The possibility of
huge reserves of natural gas and oil, and the potential for newly navigable
channels have led to competing claims by the United States, Canada,
Russia, Denmark, and Norway over large sections of the Arctic.2  The
United States, however, is in danger of losing out due to the obstructionist
efforts of a handful of isolationist Senators who consigned a crucial treaty
providing a mechanism to negotiate these claims to the deep freeze of the
United States Senate for nearly twelve years.3  While the other Arctic
nations have long since ratified the treaty and are proceeding to stake out
the future of the region, the United States remains seated on the sidelines.4
Despite the unanimous support of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the backing of the current administration, Senate leaders,
under pressure from a small cadre of anti-internationalist Senators, have
declined to schedule a floor vote on the Law of the Sea.5 It is time for a
1. Clifford Krauss et al., As Polar Ice Turns to Water, Dreams of Treasure Abound, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at Al.
2. Id.
3. A Place at the Table: U.S. Would Lose as Arctic Area is Divvied Up and Exploited by
Other Countries, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 14, 2005, at 6B [herinafter A Place at the
Table]; Krauss et al., supra note 1, at Al.
4. A Place at the Table, supra note 3.
5. See Editorial, Don't Sink 'Law of the Sea,' L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2004, at B12; Editorial,
Treaty's Foes Could Scuttle U.S. Interests, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 5, 2004, available at
http://www.lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/opeds.html#phiIly.
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new approach that will free this critical law from its icy prison. The
president should withdraw the treaty from the Senate and work with both
Houses of Congress to foster a Congressional-Executive agreement to
ensure that America is not left out in the cold.
II. Renewed Interest in the Arctic Region and
a Snapshot of Recent Territorial Claims
Until recently, international strategic concern with the Arctic Ocean
was limited to the comings and goings of nuclear submarines. 6 Over the
past decade, however, the steady shrinking of the Arctic ice cap has fueled
a renewed economic and political interest in the region. As Dr. Rob
Huebert, of the University of Calgary Centre for Military and Strategic
Studies in Canada, has observed, now, in the post-Cold War global
warming era, "everyone is pitching for action. Climate change is reshaping
the Arctic [and] [t]he issues are energy, fish and shipping lanes." 7
In September 2005, scientists from the National Snow and Ice Data
Center (NSIDC) in Boulder, Colorado, reported that the Arctic ice cap had
shrunk to the smallest expanse ever recorded. 8 Arctic experts predict this
melting will continue and eventually create a "seasonally open sea nearly
five times the size of the Mediterranean." 9 As the ice thins, exploration of
ocean oil and natural gas deposits becomes more feasible. The United
States Geological Survey estimates that "one quarter of the world's
undiscovered oil and gas resources lies in the Arctic."10 While melting ice
bodes ill for fragile Arctic ecosystems and could have a deleterious effect
on climates on the rest of the planet, with change comes opportunity.1" As
temperatures change, pink salmon are colonizing Arctic tributaries, cod are
traveling northward, and large-scale commercial fisheries are becoming
increasingly viable.' 2 Furthermore, lucrative navigable shipping channels,
including the famed North West Passage and the lesser-known North East
Passage, which both link the European continent with China, appear, for
6. Paul Reynolds, The Arctic's New Gold Rush, BBC NEWS, Oct. 25, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/4354036.stm.
7. Id.
8. Richard Black, Arctic Ice 'Disappearing Quickly', BBC NEWS, Sept. 28, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4290340.stm.
9. Krauss et al., supra note 1.
10. Id.
11. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (online ed. 2006),
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ay.html.
12. Alex Duval-Smith, Arctic Booms As Climate Change Melts Polar Ice Cap: The Global
Hunger for Oil Is Fuelling a New Gold Rush, OBSERVER (U.K.), Nov. 27, 2005, at 21; Krauss et
al., supra note 1.
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the first time in centuries, to be more than pipedreams. 13  All of this
commotion in the frigid North has attracted the interest of various
competing sovereignties, environmentalists, and the energy, fishing,
freight, and cruise-line industries, among others.
14
Unfortunately, and somewhat predictably, the opening up of the Arctic
is proving far from smooth sailing in the realm of international relations.
The Arctic Ocean is unique in that it is the only place on the planet where
the borders of five countries-the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway,
and Denmark-come together "the way sections of an orange meet at the
stem." 15 As the Arctic region becomes less forbidding, long-held tensions
between these nations and competing claims to Arctic waterways are
coming to the surface. The United States and Canada are engaged in an
ongoing dispute over rights to the North West Passage and the Beaufort
Sea. 16 Norway and Russia are fighting over a disputed part of the Barents
Sea thought to be rich in oil and gas deposits. 17 In 2001, Russia staked a
claim to over half the Arctic, following a tradition set by Stalin who once
"simply drew a line from the northern Russian port of Murmansk to the
North Pole and declared it to be the Soviet Union's polar territory.
' 8
While the other nations have challenged Russia's claim,1 9 on another
front the Russian parliament has so far refused to ratify a 1990 agreement
with the United States over rights to fish and other resources in the Bering
Sea.20 Not to be outdone, Denmark, an Arctic nation through its colonial
possession of Greenland, has laid claim to the North Pole itself.21 Finally,
in what may qualify as one of the more comical territorial disputes of
modem times, Denmark and Canada are now engaged in their own cold
war over Hans Island, an uninhabited speck of rock between Greenland and
13. Duval-Smith, supra note 12 ("Arctic expert" Olav Fagelund Knudsen considers control
of the North East Passage and its "lucrative" shipping between Europe and China "[t]he most
exciting development in the region."); Krauss et al., supra note 1; Reynolds, supra note 6.
14. Amanda Griscom, Do the Right Thing: Frist Sides with Right- Wingers to Stymie Widely
Supported Sea Treaty, GRIST, Jun. 17, 2004, http://www.grist.org/news/muck/2004/06/17/
griscom-treaty/; Krauss et al., supra note 1.
15. Krauss et al., supra note 1.
16. Duval-Smith, supra note 12. The Canadians have long claimed sovereignty over a huge
swath of the Arctic archipelago in the north of the country and a big chunk of the surrounding
waters. The United States has refused to recognize much of this, declaring the North West
Passage to be an international waterway. Breaking the Ice: Sovereignty Over the Arctic,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 2004.
17. Duval-Smith, supra note 12; Reynolds, supra note 6.
18. Reynolds, supra note 6; accord Krauss et al., supra note 1.
19. Krauss et al., supra note 1.
20. Duval-Smith, supra note 12; Reynolds, supra note 6.
21. Reynolds, supra note 6.
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the Canadian coastline.22 Although control over the rock could one day
determine exploration rights, the confrontation thus far has been limited to
trips by the countries' respective ministers clad in government-issued
parkas, and some surreal incidents where "landing parties from both navies
raise their national flag and leave whisky and brandy as signs of their
visit . ... ,23
Joking aside, all of the above is evidence of the Arctic nations'
jockeying for position in this new "gold" rush. At a time when melting ice
portends an influx of new drilling, shipping, fishing, and cruise ship travel,
it is imperative that some order be brought to this imminent stampede in
order to preserve the environment, and protect economic and national
security.24 In fact, such a mechanism already exists in a provision of the
Law of the Sea treaty. The problem for United States interests in the Arctic
is that a handful of Senators on Capitol Hill continue to find ways to block
ratification of this accord, leaving America on the sidelines and the Arctic
in danger of "uncontrolled pillage. 25
III. Brief History of UNCLOS, the CLCS Provision
for Resolving Territorial Disputes, and
the Tortuous Path of the Treaty in the Senate
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS")
is a long-time work-in-progress international maritime law. Initially
completed in 1982, the treaty provides for governance and dispute
resolution on a multitude of issues involving the world's oceans. 26 Chief
among these are "navigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic
jurisdiction, legal status of resources on the seabed ... , passage of ships
through narrow straits, conservation and management of living marine
resources, protection of the marine environment.., and, a more unique
feature, a binding procedure for settlement of disputes between
States .... ,,27 The United Nations ("U.N.") characterizes UNCLOS as "an
22. Duval-Smith, supra note 12; Reynolds, supra note 6.
23. Reynolds, supra note 6.
24. Industrialization Threatens the Arctic: Drilling, Mining, Shipping Will Soar When
Summer Ice is Gone, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Nov. 22, 2005, at 12A [hereinafter
Industrialization Threatens the Arctic].
25. A Place at the Table U.S. Would Lose, supra note 3; Inudstrialization Threatens the
Arctic, supra note 24.
26. UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1998),
available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/convention historical_
perspective.htm [hereinafter UNCLOS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE].
27. Id.
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unprecedented attempt by the international community to regulate all
aspects of the resources of the sea and uses of the ocean, and thus bring a
stable order to mankind's very source of life."
28
Of chief significance for the Arctic region is Article 76 of the
Convention and Annex II, which establishes a Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf to assess each Arctic nation's territorial claims.29
Article 76 appears under Part VI of the Convention, which is concerned
with the "continental shelf."30 When the convention's framers debated this
topic during the 1970s drafting period, they were pondering the "rich
bounty of... resources and uses.., found underneath the waves on and
under the ocean floor," including oil, natural gas, minerals, gold, and
diamonds.3' In particular, they were wrestling with the following
questions: "What should be the extent of a coastal State's jurisdiction over
these resources? Where and how should the lines demarcating their
continental shelves be drawn?,
32
UNCLOS begins to answer these questions in the first section of
Article 76. It defines the continental shelf of a coastal state as comprising
"the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its
territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin .... ,3 In the alternative, "where the
outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance,"
the continental shelf will be adjudged "a distance of 200 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured. 3 4 Furthermore, where the continental margin extends beyond
200 miles, "nations may claim jurisdiction up to 350 miles from the
baseline or 100 miles from the 2,500 metre depth, depending on certain
criteria such as the thickness of sedimentary deposits.
3
28. Id.
29. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 76, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-39 (1994), 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; see also id.
Annex II (Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf).
30. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 76.
31. UNCLOS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 26.
32. Id.
33. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 76, § 1. Clifford Krauss et al. provided more of a
layman's understanding of a "continental shelf' in his recent New York Times article: "The shelf
is the relatively shallow extension of a landmass to the point where the bottom drops into the
oceanic abyss. But in many places, the drop-off is a gentle slope or is connected to long-
submerged ridges that, if precisely mapped, might add thousands of square miles to a country's
exploitable seabed." Krauss et al., supra note 1.
34. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 76, § 1.
35. Id. art. 76, § 5; UNCLOS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 26.
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So why does any of this matter for the realpolitik of the modem Arctic
great game? Well, Article 77, the kicker to its immediate numerical
predecessor, declares in simple yet powerful language that "[t]he coastal
State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. 36 Of course, if, as is the
case in the Arctic Ocean, a seabed appears to be a natural resource treasure
trove beyond the standard-issue 200 miles, a coastal state will do its very
best to claim jurisdiction all the way up to the 350-mile limit. Icebreaker
and nuclear submarines have surveyed only a small fraction of the Arctic to
date, and now "various countries are mounting new mapping expeditions to
claim the most territory they can.,
37
Section 8 of Article 76 provides insight as to how UNCLOS would
evaluate such a claim. It indicates that a U.N. entity known as the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ("CLCS"), established
under Annex II to the Convention, will consider "[i]nformation on the
limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles" which "shall be
submitted by the coastal State. 38 CLCS will then review the data and
"make recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the
establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf., 39 Section 8
states that "[t]he limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the
basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding.
' 40
Annex II requires that the CLCS "consist of 21 members who shall be
experts in the field of geology, geophysics or hydrography, elected by
States Parties to this Convention from among their nationals, having due
regard to the need to ensure equitable geographical representation, who
shall serve in their personal capacities. ' 41 Annex II also establishes limits
on the duties of the CLCS. For example, Annex II requires the CLSC to
consider scientific data provided by a coastal state only where it is claiming
jurisdiction in excess of 200 nautical miles, to provide scientific and
technical advice on information gathering, and to render recommendations
to party states on their territorial claims within the limits of Article 76.42
Article 76 does not describe CLCS as the final arbiter of international
disputes; rather it alludes to the Commission as something of a dispute-
resolution forum. If a coastal state accepts a CLCS recommendation and
36. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 77, § 1.
37. Krauss et al., supra note 1.
38. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 76, § 8.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. Annexll, art. 2,§ 1.
42. Id. Annex II, art. 3, § 1.
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establishes its continental shelf limit accordingly, it is possible that it could
not later argue for enlargement of that limit.
43
In the crowded Arctic Ocean region, the CLCS will likely have to
analyze competing claims of natural prolongation of competitors'
continental shelves. It appears especially problematic in the Arctic
because, as Peter Croker, current Chair of the CLCS observed: "It's the
only place where a number of countries encircle an enclosed ocean. There
is a lot of overlap. If you take a normal coastal state, the issues are limited
to adjoining states and an outer boundary. In the Arctic, it is quite
different." 44 In one of its first acts in the frozen North, the CLCS recently
ruled against the 2001 Russian submission by rejecting its claim to a
greater share of the Arctic and instructing it to "reconsider and resubmit its
claim. 45
When UNCLOS was first completed in 1982 it "reflected
longstanding U.S. negotiating objectives" but still "contained provisions on
deep seabed mining at odds with U.S. interests."A6  President Ronald
Reagan rejected the treaty due to these concerns but praised its "many
positive and very significant accomplishments," and in 1983 issued an
Ocean Policy Statement announcing the U.S. intention to generally abide
by the terms of UNCLOS.4 7 Four years of negotiations on deep seabed
mining began in 1990 and resulted in amendments that resolved the Reagan
administration's earlier problems with the Convention.48 President Bill
Clinton signed the amended UNCLOS on July 29, 1994, and on October 7,
1994 submitted it to the Senate for its "advice and consent" as required
under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution.49 On November 16, 1994,
one year after Guyana became the sixtieth party to ratify the Convention,
UNCLOS officially went into force.50
43. See id art. 76, § 8.
44. Reynolds, supra note 6.
45. Id.
46. David B. Sandalow, Law of the Sea Convention: Should the U.S. Join?, 2004
BROOKINGS INST. POL'Y BRIEF 137, at 2, available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm
policybriefs/pb137.pdf (the problematic language included "requirements for the mandatory
transfer of technologies").
47. Id.
48. Id; Senator Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, The Law
of the Sea Convention: The Case for Senate Action, Address at the Brookings Institution (May 4,
2004) (transcript available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/200405041ugar.htm).
49. President's Message to Senate Transmitting United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, S. TREATY DOc. NO. 103-39 (1994), avaialbe at http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/
presidentialmessage.pdf.
50. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 309, § 1; UNCLOS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 26.
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Nearly twelve years later, all of the Arctic coastal states have ratified
UNCLOS and have begun to submit claims to CLCS based on the "natural
prolongation" of their respective continental shelves. 51 Despite support
from both political parties and the express urging of Presidents Clinton and
George W. Bush, the Senate has thus far failed to ratify the Convention by
the constitutionally required two-thirds majority.5 2  The Senate Foreign
Relations Committee-through the actions of then Chariman Jesse Helms
(R.-N.C.), himself a staunch UNCLOS opponent-stalled the Convention
for almost a decade.53 Helms, a persistent critic of the U.N. and various
international compacts, refused to even hold hearings on the treaty during
his tenure.54
On February 7, 2002, President Bush designated UNCLOS as one of
five treaties in "urgent need for Senate approval., 55  Following Helms'
retirement in 2003, vocal UNCLOS supporter Senator Richard Lugar (R.-
Ind.) assumed the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. 56 Under his stewardship, the Committee finally held hearings
on the Convention in 2003 and 2004. . On February 25, 2004, the
Committee voted nineteen to zero to recommend ratification of the treaty
and submit it to the full Senate for approval.58
During this most recent push for ratification, officials from the
Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Navy,
the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Commerce Department all testified in
support of UNCLOS. 59 The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy (appointed
by President Bush) "strongly endorsed U.S. accession to the Law of the
51. UNITED NATIONS DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA,
CHRONOLOGICAL LISTS OF RATIFICATIONS OF, ACCESSIONS AND SUCCESSIONS TO THE
CONVENTION AND THE RELATED AGREEMENTS AS AT 20 SEPTEMBER 2005 (2005),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological-lists-of ratifications.htm (stating that
UNCLOS was ratified by Norway on June 24, 1996, by the Russian Federation on March 12,
1997, by Canada on November 7, 2003, and by Denmark on November 16, 2004); Reynolds,
supra note 1 (noting that Russia became the first to submit an official Arctic claim to CLCS in
2001).
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur ... ").
53. Sandalow, supra note 46, at 2.
54. Id.
55. Senator Richard G. Lugar, U.S. Leadership in the World and the Law of the Sea,
http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/sea.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2007).
56. Sandalow, supra note 46, at 2.
57. Id.
58. Lugar, supra note 55.
59. Lugar, supra note 48.
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Sea.",60 And Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice strongly encouraged
ratification at her January 18, 2005 confirmation hearing before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.61 In the private sector, "every major ocean
industry, including shipping, fishing, oil and natural gas, drilling
contractors, ship builders, and telecommunications companies that use
underwater cables, support U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea and are
lobbying in favor of it."'62  Finally, several prominent environmental
organizations, including the Natural Resources Defense Council and the
Ocean Conservancy, formed an unlikely alliance with big oil and gas to
support UNCLOS because its provisions "protect and preserve the marine
environment and establish a framework for further international action to
combat pollution.,
63
Despite this apparent vote of confidence during the Republican control
of the Senate prior to the congressional elections in November 2006, then
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R.-Tenn.) refused to schedule a floor
vote on this critical agreement.64 Frist remained evasive as to when or even
if there will ever be an opportunity for an up-or-down vote, claiming there
is an "inadequate understanding of what Law of the Sea Treaty actually is,
what it does.,, 65 Apparently, unanimous approval of the Convention by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee was not enough to convince then
Senate Majority Leader, that the Senate understood the ramifications of the
Convention. Instead, Frist thought that "not enough senators paid adequate
attention to it."'66 Senator Frist, under pressure from the most conservative
members of his party, reprised the role of Senator Helms but from a higher
position of power in the Senate. As such, a small band of Republicans held
UNCLOS, or "LOST" as its opponents disparagingly call it, hostage in the
labyrinthine halls of Senate procedure.67  As one congressional aide
60. Id.
61. The Nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State: Hearings Before the
S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 109th Cong. 25 (2005) (statement of Dr. Condoleezza Rice),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senatehearings&
docid=f:22847.pdf.
62. Lugar, supra note 48.
63. Id.; Griscom, supra note 14.
64. Griscom, supra note 14; Editorial, Don't Sink 'Law of the Sea,' supra note 5.
65. Robert B. Bluey, Should Senate Ratify Law of the Sea Treaty?, HUMAN EvENTS, Feb. 7,
2005.
66. Id.
67. Id. (Senator James Inhofe (R.-Okla.): "I will fight to the bitter end to oppose successful
ratification.... The only reason everyone seemed to be in favor of the Law of the Sea Treaty was
that nobody knew what it was." Senator Jon Kyl (R.-Ariz.): "I don't think I could vote in favor
of it right now." Senator Wayne Allard (R.-Colo.): "I have some concerns about it. And the
more I find out about it, the more concerned I get to be, let's put it that way.... I am very
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observed, "[b]asically, we have a bunch of fringe, armchair, isolationist
ideologues who are holding up this treaty .... ,68 Another congressional
aide noted that "Frist is supposed to be the leader of the Senate
Republicans, but he's doing the bidding of a radical few., 6 9 As to the
treaty's chances, should it ever make it to a floor vote, the latter aide
believed "we could get well over the 70 votes necessary to pass this treaty.
Guaranteed.,
70
In fact, since the 2004 committee approval, and in spite of President
Bush's support, UNCLOS has become a bogeyman for many in the
conservative movement.7' Mark Helmke, an aide to Senator Lugar, points
out the irony of this: "[T]hese right-wingers have spent decades being
vehemently anti-Soviet and now they're letting Russia take over Santa
Claus land. 72 It is in this environment the treaty currently languishes, the
urgings of the president, the secretary of state, the military, the energy
industry, and environmental organizations in favor of ratification
notwithstanding. Meanwhile, Senator Lugar continues to spearhead the
push for UNCLOS and notes that the CLCS:
[W]ill soon begin making decisions on claims to continental
shelf areas that could impact the United States' own claims to the
area and resources of our broad continental margin. Russia is
already making excessive claims in the Arctic. Unless we are
party to the Convention, we will not be able to protect our
national interest in these discussions.73
concerned." Senator Jeff Sessions (R.-Ala.): "I don't plan to vote for it. I don't think it's critical.
If it ain't broke, don't fix it. I've not seen a lot of big, critical issues that would be solved by it. I
mean, you could conjure up things that might happen way out in the future, but they haven't
happened yet. We're talking, virtually, about an international tax. And I'm not for international
taxation."); see also Stephen Dinan, Skeptical Senate Eyes Sea Treaty, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2005, at A 15.
68. Griscom, supra note 14.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, Op-Ed., Law of the Sea Treaty: Covenant Undermines the U.S.,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at A21; Carrie E. Donovan, The Law of the Sea Treaty, HERITAGE
FOUND., Apr. 2, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wm470.cfm;
see also Editorial, Don 't Sink 'Law of the Sea,' supra note 5 (quoting one anti-internationalist
caller to Rush Limbaugh's radio show in the aftermath of the nineteen to zero Committee vote
denouncing UNCLOS as a scheme to "dissolve or diminish U.S. sovereignty and replace it with
global governance"); Griscom, supra note 14.
72. Griscom, supra note 14.
73. Lugar, supra note 48.
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IV. The Congressional-Executire Agreement
As an Alternative to the Article II Treaty
in Concluding International Accords
Article II, Section 2, clause 2 of the United States Constitution states
that the president "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur .... 74 It is the only constitutional provision that expressly
provides the United States with a mechanism for making international
agreements.75 The Treaty Clause is not, however, the exclusive source of
executive power in this realm, nor is it the only option for concluding
international agreements. As the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law explains, the United States may make "international agreements other
than treaties," chief among these being the Congressional-Executive
agreement. 76 As numerous scholars have observed, "many international
accords, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and the World Trade Organization, are approved as congressional-
executive agreements by simple majorities of both Houses. 77 In fact, since
World War II, the number of international compacts passed as some form
of executive agreement has dwarfed those concluded as traditional Article
II 7811 treaties.
7
The Restatement instructs that: "the President, with the authorization
or approval of Congress, may make an international agreement dealing
with any matter that falls within the powers of Congress and of the
President under the Constitution. ' 79 In passing legislation that will create a
Congressional-Executive agreement, Congress, with a simple majority in
the House and the Senate, may "authorize the President to negotiate and
conclude an agreement, or ... may also approve an agreement already
74. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
75. Phillip R. Trimble & Alexander W. Koff, All Fall Down: The Treaty Power in the
Clinton Administration, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 55, 58 (1998).
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 cmt. a (1987).
77. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 799,
801 (1995).
78. Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 60 ("From 1939 to 1982, the United States concluded
608 Article II treaties and 9,548 executive agreements. In 1982 alone the United States
concluded 372 executive agreements and only seventeen Article II treaties."). Presumably,
Professor's Trimble's figures include sole-executive agreements in the "executive agreements"
category, a different animal in kind from the Congressional-Executive agreement, but
nevertheless the essential point-that the treaty is no longer close to being the dominant or sole
means of concluding international agreements-remains true
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303(2).
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concluded by the President., 80  Congress itself cannot enter into
international agreements, as Article II vests the president with sole power
to negotiate with foreign governments on behalf of the United States.81
Critically, for our purposes, the Restatement explains that:
Since any agreement concluded as a Congressional-Executive
agreement could also be concluded by treaty... , either method
may be used in many cases. The prevailing view is that the
Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an
alternative to the treaty method in every instance. Which
procedure should be used is a political judgment, made in the
first instance by the President, subject to the possibility that the
Senate might refuse to consider a joint resolution of Congress to
approve an agreement, insisting that the President submit the
agreement as a treaty. 2
Professor Trimble has outlined the mechanics of choosing whether to
conclude an international agreement via a treaty or a Congressional-
Executive agreement: 83 "Upon successful conclusion of a negotiation, the
President must decide which constitutional procedure to use to secure the
necessary domestic law authority to support his decision to bring the treaty
into force as an obligation of the United States. 84 For the most part, the
president is constrained to choosing between two procedures: submitting
the agreement as an Article II treaty for approval by two-thirds of the
Senate, or seeking the assent of the whole Congress through ordinary
Article I legislation requiring only a simple majority in the House and the
Senate.85 While Article II contains the lone reference to concluding
international accords, "the Constitution does not require the President to
use Article II. The President may alternatively seek congressional
authorization of an international agreement by joint resolution or act of
Congress, which requires a majority vote of both Houses ....
Historically, "the choice of constitutional procedure by the President has
been at least in part a political choice. 87
Several constitutional scholars, the majority of whom approve of
Congressional-Executive agreements, use the text of the Constitution to
80. Id. § 303 cmt. e.
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
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defend the legitimacy of the device.88 Professors Ackerman and Golove
make a convincing case that while the mechanism is a "modem
development, departing radically from the constitutional practice of the
first 150 years of the Republic," the Constitution "does permit an
interpretation that supports modernist practice." 89 These scholars begin by
focusing on what the Constitution does not say. Neither the Treaty Clause
of Article II, nor any other text in the Constitution, explicitly states that
international accords may "only" be ratified by two-thirds of the Senate.
90
They next point out that this silence "seems more meaningful once the
Treaty Clause is situated among other constitutional texts." 91 Taken as a
whole, they argue, it is apparent that the Constitution has no problem with
using Congress as a whole to approve international agreements. Under
Article I, the authors point out, both Houses have the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations," to "declare War," and to "raise and
support Armies. 92 Further, if Congress finds that legislative approval of
an international accord negotiated by the president is "necessary and
proper" to exercise such powers, then, the authors conclude, there is no
reason Congress should be "barred from approving the agreement merely
because two thirds of the Senate could achieve the same end under the
Treaty Clause. 93
Scholars also look to historical practice and what are referred to as
theories of constitutional "moments" or "increments" to explain the
development of the Congressional-Executive agreement. 94  Some
academics see the use of some form of the modern Congressional-
Executive agreement as having historical pedigree all the way back to
President George Washington. 95 But while there are a few nineteenth-
century antecedents, such as the annexation of Texas and Hawaii (which
became possible only through joint resolutions of Congress after the Senate
rejected annexation treaties), Ackerman and Golove have made a
convincing case that it was not until the New Deal and the aftermath of
88. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77; Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 58-59.
89. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 801, 811.
90. See id. at 811.
91. Id.
92. Id; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 11, 12.
93. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 811; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
94. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77; Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements,
and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REv. 961 (2001); Trimble & Koff, supra 75.
95. See Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 59.
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World War II that the modem, interchangeable Congressional-Executive
agreement was born.96
The roots of an alternative method of concluding international
agreements made by the president are found in the Senate's rejection of the
Treaty of Versailles in 1921. Although a majority of the Senate approved
of the terms of the treaty ending World War I and establishing the League
of Nations-as President Woodrow Wilson requested after negotiating the
treaty in Paris-supporters were unable to muster the two-thirds vote
required by Article 11.98 Instead, Congress was forced to pass a joint
resolution to officially end hostilities with the war's belligerents.99 As is
the case today with UNCLOS, a minority of isolationist conservative
Senators "blocked American participation in the League of Nations,"
leading to what some internationalist intellectuals in the 1930s and 40s
argued were disastrous consequences for world peace and security.l°°
During the New Deal, and especially during World War II,
internationalist scholars and lawyers within the Roosevelt Administration,
chilled by the specter of Versailles, sought a new mechanism for
concluding international agreements that would not run afoul of isolationist
sentiment in the Senate.' °  As solutions to Depression-era economic
problems were often international in scope, and as it became clear that the
post-war world would require numerous international agreements, the
Administration and its allies began toying with the idea of the
Congressional-Executive agreement as an alternative to the treaty.10 2 Legal
scholars such as Myres McDougal, Edward Corwin, and Wallace McClure
challenged the idea of the treaty as the exclusive means to execute
international accords.10 3 They confronted the anti-democratic view of the
96. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 832-33 (observing that the annexations of Texas
and Hawaii "involved neither treaties nor executive agreements. Both transactions were
accomplished entirely through the enactment of ordinary legislation-and thus were merely cases
of 'legislative unilateralism."'). They also contend that the initial agreements rejected by the
Senate could not technically be treaties as neither Texas nor Hawaii would remain "foreign
nations" post-annexation and that Congress merely utilized its express constitutional power to
admit new states into the Union. Id.; accord Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 60.
97. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77; Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 59.
98. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 861-62 (identifying the Senate vote of forty-nine
to thirty-five in favor of the Treaty of Versailles.).
99. Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 60.
100. Id. at 59; accord Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 861-62.
101. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77.
102. See id at 860-66.
103. Id. at 866-72; see, e.g., Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-
Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE
L.J. 181 (1945).
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Constitution that would allow a handful of Senators to block the will of a
majority of both Houses and the president and, consequently, the American
people who elected them.
10 4
Matters came to a head in May 1944, when "the House of
Representatives formally approved a constitutional amendment ousting the
Senate from its traditional prerogative."' 5 The amendment sought to alter
the Treaty Clause such that "a majority of both Houses would be granted
the power to approve treaties." °10 6  Seeking to maintain an "emerging
internationalist consensus," Roosevelt adopted a more conciliatory
approach whereby some of the World War II-era international agreements
would be submitted as traditional Article II treaties and others through the
new vehicle of the Congressional-Executive agreement. 0 7 It was a testing
ground and over the next several years the Senate, under great public and
institutional pressure, effectively demonstrated its assent to the modem,
interchangeable device.' 
08
In the 1940s, President Roosevelt submitted the United Nations
Charter as a treaty but then, along with his successor, President Harry
Truman, proceeded to submit a raft of critical international accords as
Congressional-Executive agreements. 0 9 In short order, Congress used this
method to approve the Bretton-Woods Agreement (establishing the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) and the Headquarters
Agreement with the United Nations. 10 Congress also used this procedure
to affirm United States entry into the Food and Agricultural
Organization."'I Moreover, Congress allowed for United States
participation in the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), the International Refugee Organization, and the
World Health Organization." 2  The newly-used and powerful device
104. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 866-72 ("This antidemocratic bias was
especially intolerable in a world in which the line between foreign and domestic policy-making
had become arbitrary. If a two-House procedure was good enough for the resolution of
fundamental questions at home, why not for those that had implications overseas?").
105. Id. at 865.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 866, 874.
108. See id.
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 reporters' n.8 (1987);
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 873-74.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 reporters' n.8; Ackerman &
Golove, supra note 77, at 891-92, n.425; Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 59-60.
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 reporters' n.8; Ackerman &
Golove, supra note 77, at 891-92, n.425; Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 59-60.
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 reporters' n.8; Ackerman &
Golove, supra note 77, at 891-92, n.425; Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 59-60.
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gained overwhelming institutional acceptance during this period, creating
what Ackerman and Golove refer to as a "constitutional moment" where
the American people-the creators of the Constitution--"supported
fundamental [constitutional] changes."
'' 3
In years following Roosevelet's and Truman's uses of the
Congressional-Executive agreement, almost every other president has
utilized Congressional-Executive agreements to conclude a wide array of
important international agreements. For example, in 1972, President
Richard Nixon used a Congressional-Executive agreement to pass the first
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), "[o]ne of the first major
nuclear arms reduction agreements" with the Soviet Union.' 14 In 1994,
President Clinton submitted, and the Congress approved, the landmark
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a Congressional-
Executive agreement.' 15  In 1998, the similarly groundbreaking trade
agreement that authorized American participation in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) was submitted by President Clinton and approved by
majorities in both Houses.116
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
constitutionality of the Congressional-Executive agreement as a means to
conclude international accords. 1 7 However, in 1936, the Court remarked
that the president's ability to engage in foreign affairs "did not depend
upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution," and in this "vast external
realm... the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation., ' 8 In United States v. Belmont"19 and United
States v. Pink,120 cases involving the use of sole-executive agreements, the
Court ruled that such "international compacts and agreements... have a
similar dignity" to Article II treaties. 12  Furthermore, as Ackerman and
113. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 873, 895, 910-14.
114. Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 59; accord Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at
901.
115. See Spiro, supra note 94, at 962.
116. See id; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 reporters'
n.9 ("Preference for Congressional-Executive trade agreements. Tariffs and other trade matters
have been dealt with by treaty, especially treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation, but
agreements on these subjects are now commonly effected by Congressional-Executive agreement,
in recognition of the special role of the House of Representatives in raising of revenue. U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 7.").
117. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 915.
118. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-19 (1936).
119. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
120. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
121. Id. at230.
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Golove observed, since World War II "the Court has been extremely
deferential on foreign affairs, allowing Congress and the President to fight
out their constitutional battles on their own terms. 122
The most recent case implicating the legitimacy of the Congressional-
Executive agreement is Dames & Moore v. Regan.'23  There, the Court
upheld the use of a sole-executive agreement by President Carter that
secured the release of American hostages held by Iran in exchange for the
delivery of frozen Iranian assets to a claims tribunal in The Hague. 124 In
reaching its conclusion, the Court invoked Justice Jackson's famous
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 125 and looked to
the extent of congressional approval of President Carter's acts. 126  The
Court found that that Congress had "acquiesced in the President's action,"
noting that Congress had previously approved similar claim settlement
agreements and had not objected in this instance.127  As Ackerman and
Golove suggest, if, as indicated by the Dames & Moore Court, the test of
the legitimacy of "international agreements other than treaties" depends on
the support of Congress, then it seems likely that a Congressional-
Executive agreement where both Houses of Congress vote to approve an
international accord should easily pass constitutional muster. 1
28
While many have accepted the Congressional-Executive agreement as
interchangeable with the Article II treaty as a means to conclude
international accords, this view is certainly not without its critics. Chief
among them is Harvard's Laurence Tribe, who, following in the footsteps
of 1940s opponent Edwin Borchard, 129 rails against the device as
antithetical to the "reasoned and rigorous textual and structural analysis" of
constitutional inquiry. 130 Professor Tribe essentially argues that the text of
the Constitution provides only one way of concluding international
agreements-the Article II treaty. 13 1  While acknowledging that "[t]he
122. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 925.
123. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
124. Id. at 674; Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 928.
125. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
126. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668-69.
127. Id. at 661,686.
128. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 928.
129. See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Shall the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53
YALE L.J. 664 (1943-44) (denying constitutional legitimacy of congressional-executive
agreements); Edwin M. Borchard, The St. Lawrence Waterway and Power Project, 43 AM. J.
INT'L L. 411 (1949) (same).
130. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1233 (1995).
131. Seeid at 1249-50.
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congressional-executive agreement has recent practice on its side," Tribe
makes several complex textual and structural arguments that a proper
reading of the Constitution mandates the treaty as the exclusive device.
132
He concludes that neither political compromises nor "constitutional
moments," nor the passage of time are substitutes for "the path of rigorous
constitutional interpretation.' 33 In Tribe's view, then, all Congressional-
Executive agreements offered as alternatives to an Article II treaty are per
se unconstitutional.
1 34
Professor John Yoo also challenges the modem expansive view of the
Congressional-Executive agreement. 35 Instead of completely rejecting the
device, Yoo argues that the Constitution, textually and structurally, requires
the use of an Article II treaty whenever the subject matter is outside of
Congress' power and where power is shared-for example, in the area of
military agreements and arms control. 36  A Congressional-Executive
agreement, in his view, is appropriate only where the agreement implicates
"plenary" Congressional powers-for example, international economic
issues that implicate the Foreign Commerce Clause.' 37  Other scholars,
including Peter Spiro, dispute that the text and structure of the Constitution
mandates such a distinction.138 Spiro, critical of both Ackerman and Tribe,
disputes the notion of full interchangeability between the treaty and the
Congressional-Executive agreement, and uses a "constitutional increments"
theory of historical practice to identify international accords that may only
be properly concluded in treaty form.
139
In spite of these criticisms, "the prevailing view is that the
Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the
treaty method in every instance." 140  While there are the odd "empty
senatorial pronunciamentos"' 14 1 against the device, and the occasional weak
Presidential concession to the demands of the Senate, 42 "the law in this
132. Id. at 1250, 1251-72.
133. Id. at 1285.
134. Id. at 1251-72.
135. John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive
Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757 (2001).
136. Id. at 821-24.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 94, at 1006.
139. Id. at 993-1003, 1009-10.
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 cmt. e (1987).
141. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 903.
142. See Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 60-61 (referring to President Clinton's decision to
refrain from submitting the CFE Flank Agreement as a Congressional-Executive agreement under
pressure from some members of the Senate).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 34.2
area remains where it was left by President Truman and the Eightieth
Congress: if the President persuades a majority in both Houses to ratify an
executive agreement, it gains unquestioned acceptance as a binding
international obligation .... 143 As Ackerman and Golove emphasized,
"Articles I and II set up alternative systems through which the nation can
commit itself internationally-one with, and one without, the cooperation
of the House."' 144
V. Historical Precdent for the Withdrwal of a
Stalled or Rejected Treaty and Its Resubmission
As a Congressional-Executive Agreement
As noted above, the decision as to which procedure to use to conclude
an international agreement "is a political judgment, made in the first
instance by the President."1 45 As a practical matter, this would seem to
suggest that the president will submit an agreement in whichever
procedural form is most likely to effectuate its approval with minimal
political cost. But does precedent support a president in an attempt to end
an uphill battle over a treaty in the Senate by withdrawing the treaty and
resubmitting it as a Congressional-Executive agreement?
There is at least one historical analogue to such a circumstance: the
protracted tale of the St. Lawrence Seaway. In 1934, the Senate rejected a
treaty with Canada which would have enabled the construction of the St.
Lawrence Seaway. 146  Strong regional opposition to the proposed
construction made it very unlikely that the administration would garner the
required two-thirds vote in the Senate. 47 In the following years, this
project was floated as a test case for utilizing the Congressional-Executive
agreement advocated by internationalist legal intellectuals. President
Roosevelt, after signing a new accord with the Canadians, authorized its
submission as a Congressional-Executive agreement in 1941.148 Fierce
Senate resistance and the attck on Pearl Harbor forced President Roosevelt
to abort this first foray into the Congressional-Executive agreement. 1
49
143. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 903-04.
144. Id. at 920 ("[M]oreover... the text prescribes the same super-majoritarian remedy
whenever one of the normal law-making institutions is excluded from the process.").
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 303 cmt. e.
146. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 875 (noting that the treaty was defeated by a vote
of forty-six to forty-two).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 876.
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Three years later, in December 1944, supporters of the St. Lawrence
Seaway project attempted once again to resurrect the agreement.150 In the
final days of the congressional session, boosters attempted to attach the
Seaway accord to a Rivers and Harbors bill on its way through the
Congress. 151 Opponents in the Senate dealt the amendment a resounding
defeat, rejecting it in a vote of fifty-six to twenty-five. 5 2  Still, the
Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, persistent in their support of the
agreement, were gaining ground in their push for the interchangeability of
treaties and Congressional-Executive agreements. In 1946, the St.
Lawrence Seaway accord was submitted as a stand-alone Congressional-
Executive agreement-and defeated. 53  In 1954, however, with the
guidance of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the two Houses of Congress
finally approved a Congressional-Executive agreement with Canada to
construct the St. Lawrence Seaway.
1 54
The St. Lawrence Seaway episode is more than a historical aside on
the development and acceptance of a new device to conclude international
agreements. It provides a concrete example of how a president can salvage
a rejected or stalled agreement from the clutches of uncooperative members
of the Senate. Regional opposition threatened to doom an engineering
endeavor that has proven to be a huge economic boon to both the United
States and Canada. 155  Nevertheless, persistent employment of the
Congressional-Executive agreement ultimately rescued the agreement from
its watery grave. It is time that President Bush and congressional friends of
America's Arctic interests utilize the same mechanism to thaw UNCLOS
from its senatorial deep freeze.
VI. Application of the Congressional-Executive
Doctrine to UNCLOS and the Pressing
Issue of Arctic Development
The current status of UNCLOS in the United States Senate provides
an unusual and valuable opportunity to consider the full potential of the
Congressional-Executive agreement as a means to effectuate international
agreements. It is within the president's prerogative, under the executive's
Article II foreign relations powers, to withdraw the stalled UNCLOS treaty
150. Id. at 887.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 888.
153. Spiro, supra note 94, at 995.
154. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 893.
155. See generally Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway System, Seaway Facts,
http://www.greatlakes-seaway.com/en/aboutus/seawayfacts.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2007).
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from its interminable languor in the Senate, and resubmit the Convention as
a Congressional-Executive agreement. Additionally, while this course of
action may have serious political costs and ramifications, they are
outweighed by the urgent need for the United States to take its full place at
the Arctic table.
As previously discussed, for practical political reasons, a president can
normally make a calculated decision whether to submit an international
agreement as a treaty or a Congressional-Executive agreement. Generally a
smart political operator, the president will usually be able to gauge
beforehand which method is likely to obtain the required votes while
generating the least political heat. For example, presidents have used their
political savvy in determining that the United Nations Charter agreement
was best submitted as a treaty but NAFTA and participation in the WTO
were best approved as Congressional-Executive agreements. 56 Of course,
sometimes a treaty signed by an outgoing president is disavowed by the
new administration before it has any chance of being approved in either
form. The Bush Administration's opposition to the Kyoto Protocol signed
by President Clinton is an obvious example. 157 Further, unpopular treaties
without much political attention do get stalled from time to time. The
strange circumstances of UNCLOS, however, render it a different animal
and require a more radical solution.
President Clinton signed and submitted UNCLOS to the Senate with a
reasonable hope and expectation of its passage. 158  On the date of its
submission, October 7, 1994, Democrats controlled both the House and the
Senate, and a Democrat, Senator Claibome Pell served as Chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 159 Hopes for a swift passage were
dashed, however, by the dramatic election results of November 1994,
which saw Republicans regain control of both Houses of Congress.160 In a
near fatal blow, it soon became clear that arch-conservative isolationist
156. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 77, at 874, 906-07.
157. Though Clinton himself never actually submitted the Treaty to the Senate for ratification
presumably because he knew he could never get the required votes to either ratify the treaty under
Article II or even get a Congressional-Executive agreement under Article I. See Mark Udall,
Scaling New Heights or Retreating from Progress: How Will the Environment Fare Under the
Administration of President George W. Bush?, 2000 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 19.
158. See Steven Greenhouse, U.S., Having Won Changes, Is Set to Sign Law of the Sea, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 1994, at Al.
159. Pell, Claiborne de Borda-Biography Information, http:/Ibioguide.congress.gov/scripts/
biodisplay.pl?index=POOO 193.
160. See R.W. Apple, Jr., News Analysis, How Lasting a Majority?; Despite Sweeping Gains
for Republicans, History Suggests the Power Is Temporary, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at Al;
Richard L. Berke, The 1994 Elections: The Overview; G.O.P. Wins Control of Senate and Makes
Big Gains in House, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1994, at Al.
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Jesse Helms would become the new Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee; the gateway through which UNCLOS was required
to pass.161
With Helms' retirement, following years of his successful blocking of
any progress on the treaty, supporters hoped for a new beginning,
especially given the strong support of President Bush.162 Even so, despite
hearings and a unanimous vote out of committee in 2004, a handful of
isolationist Senators continue to utilize procedural tactics to prevent a floor
vote. 1
63
Thus, since its October 1994 submission to the Senate, two presidents
of very different political stripes have urged UNCLOS's ratification to no
avail. Because an Article II treaty is within the exclusive purview of the
Senate, there is a very real danger that UNCLOS could languish there
indefinitely, allowing seabed claims and critical decisions regarding the
future of the Arctic to be made without the United States having a voice.
The contention that a president has the power to unilaterally withdraw
a treaty from the Senate admittedly runs counter to some recent
pronouncements from Washington, D.C. For example, during the first year
of the current Bush Administration, the president sought to formally
withdraw a rejected treaty-the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ("CTBT")
-from the Senate, but "State Department lawyers told the White House
that a president cannot withdraw a treaty from the Senate once it has been
presented for approval."' 64  In that instance, President Bush, who had
hoped to kill the CTBT through withdrawal, ultimately "resolved to let [it]
languish in the Senate, where its supporters concede they do not have the
votes to revive it. '' 165  Moreover, earlier that year, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee issued a robust defense of its treaty power that
foreshadowed the CTBT advice. 1
66
161. David E. Rosenbaum, Control of Law-Making Now Tilts Conservative, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 1994, at B1.
162. See Lugar, supra note 55.
163. See Griscom, supra note 14.
164. Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, White House Wants to Bury Pact Banning Tests of
Nuclear Arms, N.Y.TIMES, July 7,2001, at Al.
165. Id.
166. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 145 (Comm. Print
2001) ("The President does not have the formal authority to withdraw a treaty from Senate
consideration without the Senate's concurrence. In practice, however, a President can render any
pending treaty effectively moot, at least for the duration of his time in office, simply by declaring
his unwillingness to ratify it, regardless of whatever action the Senate might take.").
[Vol. 34.2
The State Department's opinion runs counter to the broad sweep of
executive power in international relations under Article 11.167 Eminent
international law professor Michael J. Glennon has noted that custom
apparently supports a requirement that the president seek Senate consent
for the withdrawal of a disfavored treaty. 168  However, Glennon also
reasoned that:
Given the President's authority to decline to ratify a treaty
approved by the Senate, it might nonetheless be argued that he
thus possesses, a fortiori, the lesser authority to forestall Senate
approval by withdrawing a treaty. No instance has been
identified in which an executive request for the return of a treaty
has been rejected, however, or in which the Executive
"withdrew" a treaty from the Senate without its consent. 169
Even if the State Department lawyers and others are correct in their
conclusion that the president lacks the power to withdraw a treaty from the
Senate without its consent, consent to the withdrawal of UNCLOS could be
achieved in return for a commitment to pursue a Congressional-Executive
agreement on the same terms. The Senate opposition to the CTBT's
withdrawal was due to the Administration's stated goal of killing the treaty
once and for all. 70  Here, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
unanimously supported the passage of UNCLOS and if promised a
Congressional-Executive agreement in its place, would likely consent to its
withdrawal. And even if, for some reason, the treaty remained stuck in the
Senate, it is not clear why the president could not simply initiate a rival
Congressional-Executive agreement by having a sympathetic
Representative introduce a bill in the House containing the same terms as
the treaty.
If, as a majority of constitutional scholars have maintained, the
Congressional-Executive agreement is in itself a constitutional means to
make international accords, there can be nothing unconstitutional about
using it to replace the treaty form of UNCLOS currently stalled in the
Senate. In fact, while there may be other prudential concerns for a
167. See David C. Scott, Comment, Presidential Power to "Un-Sign" Treaties, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1447, 1477 (2002) ("[T]he President of the United States does, and should, have such a
power from both a constitutional and historical perspective.... President Bush has the authority
to withdraw the CTBT, even if the Senate rejects his request for its return. While presidents
should continue to request the return of treaties for the purpose of comity, on the rare occasion
that the Senate refuses, unilateral withdrawal exists as a final option.").
168. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 175 (1990).
169. Michael J. Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratification, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 277
n.119 (1983).
170. Shanker & Sanger, supra note 164.
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president, such a move would be constitutionally sound even if the Senate
rejected the treaty.' 7 1 The president may not relish a confrontation with
conservative Senators whose support and assistance may be needed on a
range of other matters. Nonetheless, as is clear from the St. Lawrence
Seaway saga, when an international agreement like the Law of the Sea is
vital enough to the prosperity and security of the United States, the
prospect of its successful passage outweighs the political costs of upsetting
a small segment of the Senate.172  Resubmission of UNCLOS in the
alternative Congressional-Executive form is an idea whose time has come.
There is also a tactical political rationale behind repackaging
UNCLOS as a Congressional-Executive agreement at this juncture: it
would create fresh political impetus to get the Convention approved. By
resubmitting it under the sponsorship of a supportive Representative, the
Administration could generate new media coverage and momentum in the
House. With the House's approval, a brighter spotlight and firmer pressure
can be brought to bear on the Senate to at least give UNCLOS a full floor
vote.
Presidential withdrawal of the stalled UNCLOS treaty and
resubmission to Congress as a Congressional-Executive agreement is
necessary to protect American interests in the imminent Arctic "gold" rush.
While the Senate dithers, America's Arctic competitors are staking out
territory while the United States watches from the sidelines. 73 Now that
the cornerstone to proactive Arctic involvement has languished in
committee for over a decade, including two years in the hands of a Senate
leadership held hostage by a handful of isolationists, the president has to
consider fresh options. There is a constitutionally sound, currently
available mechanism to thaw this frozen agreement. It is time to turn up
the heat and unleash the Congressional-Executive agreement.
VII. Conclusion
As climate change melts the polar ice caps, the world is confronting
the prospect of a new great game playing out in the Arctic Ocean. At stake
are rights over oil and natural gas, minerals, fish, navigable shipping
channels, and a coordinated approach to environmental protection.
America's Arctic rivals have ratified and begun utilizing an international
accord, the Law of the Sea, that sets forth the rules of the Artctic game and
provides a passkey to full participation in the future of the region. The
171. See Trimble & Koff, supra note 75, at 58-60.
172. See generally id
173. Krauss et al., supra note 1; Reynolds, supra note 6.
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United States is a signatory to this Convention but is frozen out of its
rightful place at the table due to the actions of a few isolationists in the
Senate who refuse to permit a vote on the treaty. It is within the president's
prerogative to decide whether to submit an international agreement as an
Article II treaty or an Article I Congressional-Executive agreement. Even a
defeated treaty can reappear and succeed in this latter form. It is not an
unconstitutional leap to say that the president can also withdraw an Article
II treaty from consideration in the Senate and resubmit it to Congress as a
Congressional-Executive agreement. At a time when uncooperative
members of the Senate are effectively forcing the United States to sit out
the first half of the game, the short-term political costs of resubmitting
UNCLOS as a log-jam busting Congressional-Executive agreement are
clearly outweighed by America's need to be a full player in the remainder
of this Arctic competition.
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